Human decisions are known to be systematically biased. A prominent example of such a bias 2 occurs when integrating a sequence of sensory evidence over time. Previous empirical studies di↵er 3 in the nature of the bias they observe, ranging from favoring early evidence (primacy), to favoring 4 late evidence (recency). Here, we present a unifying framework that explains these biases and 5 makes novel psychophysical and neurophysiological predictions. By explicitly modeling both the 6 approximate and the hierarchical nature of inference in the brain, we show that temporal biases 7 depend on the balance between "sensory information" and "category information" in the stimulus.
Introduction
this approximation can interfere with its ability to account for its own biases. Implementing two 48 approximate hierarchical inference algorithms, we find that they both result in biases in agreement 49 with our data, and can indeed explain the puzzling discrepancies in the literature. 50 Results 51 "Sensory Information" vs "Category Information" 52 Normative models of decision-making in the brain are typically based on the idea of an ideal observer, who uses Bayes' rule to infer the most likely category on each trial given the stimulus. On each trial in a typical task, the stimulus consists of multiple "frames" presented in rapid succession. (By "frames" we refer to discrete independent draws of stimulus values that are not necessarily visual). If the evidence in each frame, e f , is independent then evidence can be combined by simply multiplying the associated likelihoods. And if the categorical identity of the stimulus is a binary variable C 2 { 1, +1}, then this process corresponds to the famous sequential ratio test summing the log odds implied by each piece of evidence (Wald and Wolfowitz, 1948; Bogacz et al., 2006) :
p(e f |C = +1) log p(C = +1|e 1 , . . . , e F ) p(C = 1|e 1 , . . . , e F ) = log p(C = +1) p(C = 1) + F X f =1 log p(e f |C = +1) p(e f |C = 1) .
As a result, the ideal observer's performance is determined by (i) the information about C available 53 on each frame, p(e f |C), and (ii) the number of frames per trial. 54 However, in the brain, any decision-making area does not base its decision on the externally 55 presented stimulus directly, but rather on an intermediate sensory representation of the stimulus. high sensory/ low category information (HSLC) [3] [4] [5] [6] c) Figure 1 : a) A subject's "temporal weighting strategy" is an estimate of how their choice is based on a weighted sum of each frame of evidence e f . Three commonly observed motifs are decreasing weights (primacy), constant weights (optimal), or increasing weights (recency). b) Information in the stimulus about the category may be decomposed into information in each frame about a sensory variable ("sensory information") and information about the category given the sensory variable ("category information"). c) Category information and sensory information may be manipulated independently, creating a two-dimensional space of possible tasks. Any level of task performance can be the result of di↵erent combinations of sensory and category information. A qualitative placement of previous work into this space separates those that find primacy e↵ects in the upperleft from those that find recency e↵ects or optimal weights in the lower right (see Supplemental Text for detailed justification and C (category information). Hence for a ratio of 5 : 5, a frame's orientation does not predict the 144 correct choice and category information is 0.5. For a ratio of 10 : 0, knowledge of the orientation of Figure 2: Summary of experiment design. a) Category information is determined by the expected ratio of frames in which the orientation matches the correct category, and sensory information is determined by a parameter  determining the degree of spatial orientation coherence (Methods). At the start of each block, we reset the staircase to the same point, with category information at 9 : 1 and  at 0.8. We then ran a 2-to-1 staircase either on  or on category information. The LSHC and HSLC ovals indicate sub-threshold trials; only these trials were used in the regression to infer subjects' temporal weights. b) Visualization of a noisy stimulus in the LSHC condition. All frames are oriented to the right. c) Psychometric curves for all subjects (thin lines) and averaged (thick line) over the  staircase. Shaded gray area indicates the median threshold level across all subjects. d) Example frames in the HSLC condition. The orientation of each frame is clear, but orientations change from frame to frame. e) Psychometric curves over frame ratios, plotted as in (c). Temporal weights for individual subjects (thin lines) and the mean across all subjects (thick lines). Weights are normalized to have a mean of 1 to emphasize shape rather than magnitude. Individual subjects' curves were fit using a cross-validated smoothness term for visualization purposes only (Methods). c) Di↵erence of normalized weights (HSLC LSHC). Despite variability across subjects in (a-b), each subject reliably changes in the direction of a recency e↵ect. d) Change in slope between the two task contexts for each subject is consistently positive. Points are median slope values after bootstrap-resampling of the data. We summarize subjects' temporal weighting strategy with an exponential fit; the slope parameter > 0 corresponds to recency and < 0 to primacy (similar results for linear fits, see SI).
a single frame is su cient to determine the correct choice and category information is 1. Exactly 146 quantifying sensory information depends on individual subjects, but likewise ranges from 0.5 to 1.
147
For a more detailed discussion, see Supplementary Text.
148
Using this stimulus, we tested 12 human subjects (9 naive and 3 authors) comparing two 149 conditions intended to probe the di↵erence between the LSHC and HSLC regimes. Starting with 150 both high sensory and high category information, we either ran a 2:1 staircase lowering the sensory 151 information while keeping category information high, or we ran a 2:1 staircase lowering category 152 information while keeping sensory information high (Figure 2a ). These are the LSHC and HSLC 153 conditions, respectively (Figure 2b,d ). For each condition, we used logistic regression to infer, 154 for each subject, the influence of each frame onto their choice. Subjects' overall performance was 155 matched in the two conditions by setting a performance threshold below which trials were included 156 in the analysis (Methods).
We will now show that these significant changes in evidence weighting for di↵erent stimulus statis-168 tics arise naturally in common models of how the brain might implement approximate inference.
169
In particular, we show that both a neural sampling-based approximation (Hoyer and Hyvärinen, 170 2003; Fiser et al., 2010; Haefner et al., 2016; Orbán et al., 2016) and a parametric (mean-field) 171 approximation (Beck et al., 2013; Raju and Pitkow, 2016) can explain the observed pattern of 172 changing temporal weights as a function of stimulus statistics.
173
Optimal inference in our task, as in other evidence integration tasks, requires computing the 174 posterior over C conditioned on the evidence e 1 , . . . , e f , which can be expressed as the Log Posterior 175 Odds (LPO),
where LLO f is the log likelihood odds for frame f (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Bogacz et al., 2006) .
177
To reflect the fact that the brain has access to only one frame of evidence at a time, this can 178 be rewritten this as an online update rule, summing the previous frame's log posterior with new 179 evidence gleaned on the current frame:
This expression is derived from the ideal observer and is still exact. Since the ideal observer weights 181 all frames equally, the online nature of inference in the brain cannot by itself explain temporal 182 biases. Furthermore, because performance is matched in the two conditions of our experiment, 183 their di↵erences cannot be explained by the total amount of information, governed by the likelihood 184 p(e f |C).
185
To understand how biases arise, we must examine the log likelihood odds term, LLO, in detail.
186
In a hierarchical model, computing p(e f |C) for each C requires marginalizing over the intervening 187
x f as follows:
This suggests that evidence about the current frame is formed in a two step process: first, x f is 189 inferred given e f , and second an expectation is taken with respect to p(x f |e f ), where the operand 190 of the expectation depends only on the relation between x f and C. No sub-optimalities nor biases 191 have been introduced yet.
192
A key assumption in our models that gives rise to temporal biases is that sensory areas represent 193 the approximate posterior belief over x f given all available information, i.e. including the earlier 194 frames in the trial (equation (1)). This assumption di↵ers from some models of inference in the 195 brain that assume populations of sensory neurons strictly encode the likelihood of the stimulus (or evidence, e f , via the likelihood, but also on the brain's current belief about C, via the prior. If 202 this were not the case -if sensory areas represented only the instantaneous evidence p(e f |x f ) -203 then integrating evidence in an unbiased way would simply be a matter of applying equation (4).
204
However, such an inference scheme comes at the expense of a worse instantaneous representation 205 (Zylberberg et al., 2018) .
206
There is thus tension between inferences at two timescales. Instantaneously, it seems advanta-207 geous to represent p(x f |e 1 , . . . , e f ), while integrating evidence online requires an expectation taken 208 with respect to p(x f |e f ) (equation (4)). Assuming that the former is represented by sensory areas, 209 the decision area of an approximate ideal observer now needs to correct for, or "subtract out" (4) we would like to use 222 these samples to compute an expectation with respect to only the instantaneous evidence, p(x f |e f ).
223
The canonical way to compute an expectation with respect to one distribution using samples from . , e f ). If the brain is able to base each update on multiple 230 samples, then the importance weights of each sample in the update account for the discrepancy 231 between p(x f |e f ) and p(x f |e 1 , . . . , e f ) (Methods). While this approach is unbiased in the limit of 232 infinitely many samples, it incurs a bias for a finite number -the relevant regime for the brain 233 (Owen, 2013). The bias is as if the expectation in (4) is taken with respect to an intermediate 234 distribution that lies between the fully biased one (p(x f |e 1 , . . . , e f )) and the unbiased one (p(x f |e f ))
235
(Cremer et al., 2017).
236
Under-correcting for the prior that was fed back results in a positive feedback loop between 237 decision-making and sensory areas which we call a "perceptual confirmation bias." Importantly, 238 this feedback loop is strongest when category information is high, corresponding to stronger feed-239 back, and sensory information is low, since that makes x f less dependent on e f . Figure 4b and 
weights slope ( )
a) Figure 4 : Approximate inference models explain results. a) The di↵erence in stimulus statistics between HSLC and LSHC trade-o↵s implies that the relevant sensory representation is di↵erentially influenced by the stimulus or by beliefs about the category C. A "confirmation bias" or feedback loop between x and C emerges in the LSHC condition but is mitigated in the HSLC condition. Black lines indicate the underlying generative model, and red/blue lines indicate information flow during inference. Arrow width represents coupling strength. b) Performance of an ideal observer reporting C given ten frames of evidence. White line shows threshold performance, defined as 70% correct. c) Performance of the sampling model with = 0.1. Colored dots correspond to lines in the next panel. d) Temporal weights in the model transition from recency to a strong primacy e↵ect, all at threshold performance, as the stimulus transitions from the high-sensory/low-category to the low-sensory/high-category conditions. e) Using the same exponential fit as used with human subjects, visualizing how temporal biases change across the entire task space. Red corresponds to primacy, and blue to recency. White contour as in (c). Black lines are iso-contours for slopes corresponding to highlighted points in (c). f-h) Same as c-d but for the variational model with = 0.1.
subject change seen in our data (Haefner et al., 2016) . However, double-counting the prior alone 246 cannot explain recency e↵ects (Supplemental Figure S5a -c,j-l).
247
There are two simple and biologically-plausible explanations for the observed recency e↵ect 248 which turn out to be mathematically equivalent. First,the brain may try to actively compensate 249 for the prior influence on the sensory representation by subtracting out an estimate of that influence.
250
That is, the brain could do approximate bias correction to mitigate the e↵ect of the confirmation 251 bias. We modeled linear bias correction by explicitly subtracting out a fraction of the running 252 posterior odds at each step:
where 0   1 andLLO f is the model's (biased) estimate of the log likelihood odds. Second, the Figure S6 ). a) Model performance across task space with = 0.5 (compare with Figure 4c in which = 0.1). b) Di↵erence in performance for = 0.5 versus = 0.1. Higher improves performance in the upper part of the space where the confirmation bias is strongest. c) Optimizing for performance, the optimal ⇤ depends on the task. Where the confirmation bias had been strongest, optimal performance is achieved with a stronger leak term. d) Model performance when the optimal ⇤ from (c) is used in each task. e) Comparing the ideal observer to (d), the ideal observer still outperforms the model but only in the upper part of the space. f) Temporal weight slopes when using the optimal ⇤ are flat everywhere. The models reproduce the change in slopes seen in the data only when is fixed across tasks (compare Figure S5 ). across the space of category and sensory information (Figure 5a-b ). We found that in the LSHC from decision area to sensory area in our model is both continuous and online, rather than conditioned on a single choice after a decision is made. Second, our models are derived from an ideal 382 observer and only incur bias due to approximations, while previously proposed "self-consistency" 383 biases are not normative and require separate justification. 384 Alternative models have been previously proposed to explain primacy and recency e↵ects in 385 evidence accumulation. Kiani et al. (2008) suggested that an integration-to-bound process is more 386 likely to ignore later evidence even when task-relevant stimuli are of a fixed duration (Kiani et al.,
Low Sensory-, High Category-Information (LSHC) Condition
In the LSHC condition, a continuous 2-to-1 staircase on  was used to keep subjects near threshold
where f refers to the frame number. gives an estimate of the shape of the weights w over time,
509
while ↵ controls the overall magnitude. > 0 corresponds to recency and < 0 to primacy. The 510 parameter is reported for human subjects in Figure 3d , and for the models in Figure 4e ,h.
511
The second method to quantify slope was to constrain the weights to be a linear function in 512 time:
where slope > 0 corresponds to recency and slope < 0 to primacy. Figure 3d shows the median exponential shape parameter ( ) after bootstrapped resampling of 515 trials 500 times for each subject. Both the exponential and linear weights give comparable results 516 (Supplemental Figure S2 ).
517
To compute the combined temporal weights across all subjects (in Figure 3a -c), we first esti-518 mated the mean and variance of the weights for each subject by bootstrap-resampling of the data 519 500 times without regularization. The combined weights were computed as a weighted average 520 across subjects at each frame, weighted by the inverse variance estimated by bootstrapping.
521
Because we are not explicitly interested in the magnitude of w but rather its shape over stimulus 522 frames, we always plot a "normalized" weight, w/mean(w), both for our experimental results 523 (Figure 3a-c ) and for the model (Figure 4d,g) .
524
Approximate inference models 525 We model evidence integration as Bayesian inference in a three-variable generative model ( Figure   526 4a) that distills the key features of online evidence integration in a hierarchical model (Haefner   527   et al., 2016) . The variables in the model are mapped onto the sensory periphery (e), sensory cortex 528 (x), and a decision-making area (C) in the brain.
529
In the generative direction, on each trial, the binary value of the correct choice C 2 { 1, +1} 530 is drawn from a 50/50 prior. x f is then drawn from a mixture of two Gaussians:
Finally, each e f is drawn from a Gaussian around x f :
When we model inference in this model, we assume that the subject has learned the correct model 533 parameters, even as parameters change between the two di↵erent conditions. This is why we ran 534 our subjects in blocks of only LSHC or HSLC trials on a given day.
535
Category information in this model can be quantified by the probability that x
(gen) f is drawn 536 from the mode that matches C. We quantify sensory information as the probability with which an 537 ideal observer can recover the sign of x f . That is, in our model sensory information is equivalent 538 to the area under the ROC curve for two univariate Gaussian distributions separated by a distance 539 of 2, which is given by
where is the inverse cumulative normal distribution.
541
Because the e↵ective time per update in the brain is likely faster than our 83ms stimulus frames,
542
we included an additional parameter n U for the number of online belief updates per stimulus frame.
543
In the sampling model described below, we amortize the per-frame updates over n U steps, updating 544 n U times per frame using 1 n UL LO f . In the variational model, we interpret n U as the number of 545 coordinate ascent steps.
546
Simulations of both models were done with 10000 trials per task type and 10 frames per trial.
547
To quantify the evidence-weighting of each model, we used the same logistic regression procedure 548 that was used to analyze human subjects' behavior. In particular, temporal weights in the model 549 are best described by the exponential weights (equation (6)), so we use to characterize the model's 550 biases.
551

Sampling model
The sampling model estimates p(e f |C) using importance sampling of x, where each sample is 553 drawn from a pseudo-posterior using the current running estimate of p f 1 (C) ⌘ p(C|e 1 , .
., e f 1 ) as 554 a marginal prior:
Using this distribution, we obtain the following unnormalized importance weights.
In the self-normalized importance sampling algorithm these weights are then normalized as follows,
though we found that this had no qualitative e↵ect on the model's ability to reproduce the trends 557 in the data. The above equations yield the following estimate for the log-likelihood ratio needed 558 for the belief update rule in equation (5):
In the case of infinitely many samples, these importance weights exactly counteract the bias intro-560 duced by sampling from the posterior rather than likelihood, thereby avoiding any double-counting 561 of the prior, and hence, any confirmation bias. However, in the case of finite samples, S, biased 562 evidence integration is unavoidable.
563
The full sampling model is given in Supplemental Algorithm S1. Simulations in the main text 564 were done with S = 5, n U = 5, normalized importance weights, and = 0 or = 0.1.
565
Variational model
566
The core assumption of the variational model is that while a decision area approximates the pos-567 terior over C and a sensory area approximates the posterior over x, no brain area explicitly rep-568 resents posterior dependencies between them. That is, we assume the brain employs a mean field 569 approximation to the joint posterior by factorizing p (C, x 1 , . . . , x F |e 1 , . . . , e F ) into a product of ap-
q(x f ) and minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence 571 between q and p using a process that can be modeled by the Mean-Field Variational Bayes algorithm 572 (Murphy, 2012).
573
By restricting the updates to be online (one frame at a time, in order), this model can be seen as 574 an instance of "Streaming Variational Bayes" (Broderick et al., 2013) . That is, the model computes 575 a sequence of approximate posteriors over C using the same update rule for each frame. We thus 576 only need to derive the update rules for a single frame and a given prior over C; this is extended 577 to multiple frames by re-using the posterior from frame f 1 as the prior on frame f .
578
As in the sampling model, this model is unable to completely discount the added prior over model is forced to commit to a marginal posterior in favor of C = +1 or C = 1 and x > 0 or
x < 0 after each update, which then biases subsequent judgments of each.
582
To keep conditional distributions in the exponential family (which is only a matter of math-583 ematical convenience and has no e↵ect on the ideal observer), we introduce an auxiliary variable 584 z f 2 { 1, +1} that selects which of the two modes x f is in:
with probability equal to category info 1 otherwise (14) such that 586
We then optimize q(C)
Mean-Field Variational Bayes is a coordinate ascent algorithm on the parameters of each ap-588 proximate marginal distribution. To derive the update equations for each step, we begin with the 589 following (Murphy, 2012):
After simplifying, the new q(x f ) term is a Gaussian with mean given by equation (17) and constant
where µ C and µ z are the means of the current estimates of q(C) and q(z).
593
For the update to q(z f ) in terms of log odds of z f we obtain:
Similarly, the update to q(C) is given by:
Note that the first term in equation (19) -the log prior -will be replaced with the log posterior 596 estimate from the previous frame (see Supplemental Algorithm S2). Comparing equations (19) and
597
(3), we see that in the variational model, the log likelihood odds estimate is given by January 20, 2020
Sensory Information and Category Information in Previous Literature
In this section we justify our categorization of previous studies' stimuli into the low-sensory/highcategory information (LSHC) or high-sensory/low-category information (HSLC) regime in relation to Figure 1 and Table S1 . While category information and sensory information are well defined in our model, in the brain they will depend on the nature of the intermediate variable x relative to e and C, and those relationships depend on the sensory system under consideration. For instance, a high spatial frequency grating may contain high sensory information to a primate, but low sensory information to a species with lower acuity. Similarly, when "frames" are presented quickly, they may be temporally integrated with the e↵ect of both reducing sensory information and increasing category information. Therefore, the placement of each study in the sensory vs category information space is our best estimate, and we generally only distinguish between high and low along each dimension. Note that for the orientation discrimination task that we designed, we report the within-subject change in weights from one task condition to the other, which overcomes the di culties described above: while we cannot estimate the absolute values of sensory and category information due to our limited knowledge about the nature of the human sensory system's representation even in our task, our two-staircase task design acting on the two kinds of information separately guarantees that there will be a change in both sensory information and category information between the LSHC and HSLC conditions while performance is kept constant. Kiani et al. (2008) studied the classic motion direction discrimination task in which a monkey views a dynamic random dot motion stimulus with a certain percentage of "coherent" dots moving together and the rest moving randomly (Kiani et al., 2008; Newsome and Pare, 1988) . Monkeys were trained to categorize the direction of motion as predominantly leftward or rightward. Since the direction of the coherently moving dots (the signal) does not change over time within a trial, this stimulus contains high category information. Since the motion direction is di cult to perceive for any motion frame, it contains low sensory information (Kiani et al., 2008) . Nienborg et al. (2009) developed a task in which subjects viewed a disc with varying binocular disparity. The disc moved back and forth relative to a reference plane (the surrounding ring), changing every 10ms, at a rate too high for the macaques' (and humans') binocular system to resolve, resulting in a percept of a jittering cloud of dots which was located slightly in front of or behind the surrounding ring and blurred in depth (Nienborgprivate communication) . After 200 frames presented over 2 seconds, subjects judged whether the center disc was in front or behind the reference plane. Since the location of the perceived dot cloud is relatively stable, but itself uncertain with respect to the reference, this stimulus contains high category and low sensory information (Nienborg and Cumming, 2009 ).
Studies finding a primacy e↵ect
Studies finding a recency e↵ect or flat weighting
In two similar studies by Wyart et al. (2012) and by Drugowitsch et al. (2016) , human participants viewed a sequence of eight clearly visible oriented gratings presented for at least 250ms each. Participants reported whether, on average, the tilt of the eight elements fell closer to the cardinal or diagonal axes. These tasks contain high sensory information since for a subject there is little uncertainty about the orientation of any one grating. However they contain low category information since the orientation of any one grating provides only little information about the correct choice (Wyart et al., 2012; Drugowitsch et al., 2016) . Brunton et al. (2013) studied both a visual task and an auditory task where subjects were trained to indicate whether they saw/heard more flashes/clicks on the left or right side of the midline. These task stimuli contain high sensory information since each flash/click is high contrast/loud -well above subjects' detection thresholds. However, they contain low category information since each flash/click contains only little information about the correct choice (Brunton et al., 2013) .
Stimulus details
The stimulus was constructed from white noise that was then masked by a kernel in the Fourier domain to include energy at a range of orientations and spatial frequencies but random phases (Beaudot and Mullen, 2006; Nienborg and Cumming, 2014; Bondy et al., 2018) . The Fourier-domain kernel consisted of a product of two probability density functions (PDFs): a von Mises PDF over orientation, and a Rician PDF over spatial frequency. This is best expressed using polar coordinates in the Fourier domain:
where ✓ is the angular coordinate and ⇢ is the spatial frequency coordinate. After transforming back from the Fourier domain to an image, we applied a soft circular aperture with a hole cut out in the center for the fixation cross. The full pixel-space mask is defined by the equation
Center cutout for fixation cross where⇢ is the normalized Euclidean distance to the center of the image (⇢ = 0 at the center, and⇢ = p 2 at the corners), and erf is the Error Function. ⌧ ap controlled the width of the central cutout, and w im is the total width of the stimulus. To summarize, each stimulus frame, I, was generated according to
where F is the 2D discrete Fourier transform, ⌦ is element-wise multiplication of each pixel, and W is white noise. Images were displayed using Psychtoolbox on a 1920x1080px 120 Hz monitor with gamma-corrected luminance (Brainard, 1997) . Using an 8-bit luminance range (0 to 255), each frame was normalized to 127 ± c where c is a contrast parameter. All stimulus parameters are summarized in table S2.
Algorithms
Algorithm S1 Importance Sampling (IS) model for evidence integration LPO log p(C=+1) p(C= 1)
. initialize log posterior odds to log prior odds for f = 1 to F do for n = 1 to n U do
. sensory sample from current posterior p
. contribution of each sample to C = +1 pool p (s) p(x (s) |C = 1)
. contribution of each sample to C = 1 pool w (s) . initialize to log prior odds for f = 1 to F do
. initialize µ z f to the prior for n = 1 to n U do Orientation of each frame is clear but only weakly predictive of which "deck" the orientations were drawn from.
Decrease contrast of each frame or increase pixel noise and reduce variance of orientations within each deck. Kiani et al. (2008) Net motion is weak (low coherence) and constant over a trial.
Increase motion coherence but vary net motion direction across stimulus frames within a trial. Nienborg et al. (2009) Percept is of a jittering cloud of dots whose depth is close to fixation point.
Increase the distance between cloud and fixation point in depth; vary distance across stimulus frames at a rate resolvable by depth perception Table S1 : Justification of placement of example prior studies in Figure 1c and description of stimulus manipulations that will move it to the opposite side of the category-sensoryinformation space. Each manipulation corresponds to a prediction about how temporal weighting of evidence should change from primacy (red) to flat/recency (blue), or vice versa, as a result.
Parameter Description
Values ( Figure S2 : Same as Figure 3d in the main text, comparing slope of w using a linear fit (left) or an exponential fit (right). Using the linear fit, 11 of 12 subjects individually have a significant increase in slope (p < 0.05). Using the exponential fit, 10 of 12 subjects individually have a significant increase in slope (p < 0.05). Figure S3 : Cross-validation selects linear or exponential shapes for temporal weights, compared to both unregularized and AR2-regularized logistic regression. Panels show 20-fold cross-validation performance of four methods to fit evidence-weighting profiles, separated by task type and by subject. Magnitudes are always relative to the mean log-likelihood of the linear model. Error bars show 50% confidence intervals across folds of shu✏ed data. "Unregularized LR" refers to standard logistic regression with no regularization. "Regularized LR" refers to the ridge-and AR2-regularized logistic regression objective, where the hyperparameters were chosen to maximize cross-validated fitting performance for each subject. "Exponential" is is the 3-parameter model where weights are an exponential function of time (equation (6) plus a bias term). Similarly, the "Linear" model constrains the weights to be a linear function of time as in equation (7), plus a bias term. Figure S6 : Simulation results for optimal leak ( ) for two further model variations, panels as in Figure 5 in the main text. a-f Variational model results. As in the sampling model, we see that the optimal value of ⇤ increases with category information, or with the strength of the confirmation bias. h-l Sampling model results with S = 1 (in the main text we used S = 5). Since the sampling model without a leak term approaches the ideal observer in the limit of S ! 1, the optimal ⇤ was close to 0 for much of the space in the main text figure.
Here, by comparison, ⇤ > 0 is more common because the S = 1 model is more biased.
